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Why Are Gender Quota Laws Adopted by Men? The
Role of Inter-and Intra-Party Competition∗
Ana Catalano Weeks†
Abstract
In nearly every case of quota law adoption, the support of party elites is critical.
But this raises a puzzle: what can motivate predominantly male elites to put
these policies in place? This article uses a comparison of two sets of matched
pair countries – similar on background characteristics except for quota adoption –
to explore the motivations and role of male party elites in quota reform. The cases
of Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy highlight two key explanations.
First, quota laws are likely to be supported and passed by parties threatened
by a new, more progressive competitor on the left, as a way of claiming women
voters back from the encroaching party (inter-party competition). Second, quotas
can be employed as a mechanism for party elites to gain power over candidate
selection within their own parties, in the face of entrenched local party monopolies
(intra-party competition).
Gender quota laws are the electoral reform of our generation, and they have now been
adopted in over 50 countries (Weeks 2016; Hughes 2017). Quota laws require all political
parties to include a minimum percentage of women on their candidate lists.1 While we are
seeing more and more states adopt quotas, they remain contentious for two main reasons.
First, quotas seem to run counter to the rational self-interest of the political ruling class –
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1Voluntary party provisions (”party quotas”), are also common in advanced democracies, and are often
included in party statutes. Another policy, political reservations, requires women to be elected to certain
positions rather than only nominated. Political reservations for women are not common in advanced democ-
racies.
i.e., men. In the vast majority of cases, male elites are ultimately responsible for adopting
quota laws. Why would male party leaders and majority-male parliaments choose to institute
a policy that necessitates some of them losing their seats? Second, and more broadly, the
conventional wisdom is that institutions like electoral rules are ‘sticky’. Change is thought to
be slow-moving and path-dependent (Pierson 2004). The remarkable spread of quota reforms
in recent years challenges this notion, but has been largely overlooked in the mainstream
‘new institutionalism’ literature (Mackay et al. 2010). What makes quotas different?
As quotas have spread, a large body of work has explored why quota laws are adopted
(Htun and Jones 2002; Arau´jo and Garc´ıa 2006; Norris 2007; Krook 2009; Krook et al. 2009;
Bush 2011; Baum and Esp´ırito-Santo 2012; Meier 2012; Murray 2012; Palici di Suni 2012;
Verge 2012; Bauer and Burnet 2013; Anderson and Swiss 2014; Bjarneg˚ard and Zetterberg
2014; Hughes et al. 2015), and increasingly authors are beginning to study the effects of
quotas on women’s political engagement and power (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Clayton
2015; O’Brien and Rickne 2016). Yet, only a few studies focus on the incentives of men to
adopt a quota law. Although several authors argue that electoral competition is a crucial
incentive for male elites (Baldez 2004; Fre´chette et al. 2008; Driscoll and Krook 2012; Murray
et al. 2012), they do not identify and test the conditions under which electoral incentives
become salient. These studies also cannot explain why a leader would support imposing a
quota on all parties (giving up ownership of the quota issue) or why quotas are sometimes
adopted by parties facing little electoral uncertainty. Furthermore, the predominant focus
in the literature on single-case studies of quota adoption limits the broader applicability of
existing findings. Indeed, Murray, Krook and Opello (2009) conclude their study of France
by calling for more cross-national analysis of quota adoption “through more detailed case
studies of party decision making in other instances of quota reform” (Murray et al. 2012, p.
13).
Building on insights from the literature on gender and politics and endogenous institu-
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tions, I propose two hypotheses to explain why male party leaders adopt a quota law. First,
inter-party competition can spur party leaders to support and pass a quota in order to dis-
tinguish their party from emerging parties on the left, and (as a secondary reason) to put
parties on the right at a disadvantage. In other words, not just any electoral uncertainty
will do; quota adoption is especially likely in the context of a rising left-wing party that
spurs gender equality ‘contagion’. Imposing a law on all parties, rather than passing an
internal-party quota, has the added advantage of assuaging any fears that the quota will
lead to an electoral disadvantage because of the need to find new candidates. Second, even
when parties are not facing electoral threats intra-party competition – specifically, conflicts
between local parties and national leadership – can cause male party leaders to pass a quota
in order to gain more control over candidate selection in their own party. In the context of
decentralized selection processes, which apply to many parties and countries, it can be easier
for party leaders to pass a law than to shift powerful local party monopolies’ decision-making
processes.
To test this argument I use qualitative evidence from two matched pair case studies
selected using statistical matching – countries similar except for quota adoption. Detailed
narratives of quota adoption or failure in Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy pro-
vide new insights into the conditions under which quota laws are passed. I conducted over
sixty interviews with politicians and activists in all four countries in 2013 and 2014, and sup-
plement this data with parliamentary proceedings and newspaper coverage of quota debates.
Elite interviews make particularly good evidence for this type of parallel process tracing
because they allow the researcher to gather rich detail about the thoughts and attitudes of
key political actors, providing data to reconstruct ‘the hidden elements of political action’
(Tansey 2007, p. 767). Finally, these cases provide evidence from advanced democracies,
where quota laws are on the rise, when so far much of the literature has focused on developing
countries.
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The article proceeds as follows. I first discuss the puzzle of quota law adoption, high-
lighting the contributions and limitations of the current literature. I focus on the conditions
under which male elites would support such reforms. In the next section I introduce the
mechanisms of intra- and inter-party competition, suggesting that conditions of decentral-
ized candidate selection and a rising far left party, respectively, should incentivize male
leaders to adopt quota laws. I then discuss methods and case selection before testing my
argument through case studies of Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy. I find strong
support for intra-party competition in Belgium, where entrenched local parties were un-
responsive to internal-party quotas, while in the case of Portugal inter-party competition
played the largest role. The paired countries of Austria and Italy (2005) were characterized
by neither inter- nor intra-party incentives; in these cases, adopting a quota law over a party
quota offered leaders no strategic gain. A second, successful attempt at quota adoption in
Italy (2015) occurred only after the rise of a new far left party, giving mainstream party
leaders new inter-party incentives. I conclude with reflections on what this study offers for
understanding quota adoption and other policy reforms in parties and countries worldwide.
The Puzzle of Quota Law Adoption
Over the past few decades, take-up of gender quotas has increased dramatically. In this
article, I limit the scope to the adoption of national-level quota laws for two reasons. First,
as ‘parchment’ institutions, quota laws involve a more permanent commitment from party
leaders than an internal party rule (which is not always written into statutes, and can be
ignored or changed more easily). Second, passing a quota law constrains the selection and
nomination processes of all political parties in a country, not just those that support the law.
By passing a law, parties give up any distinction (and hence potential electoral advantage)
gained by having their own party quota. The incentives to pass a party quota versus a
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national quota law thus seem likely to be different. The adoption of party-level quotas is an
interesting puzzle in its own right, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.2
Quota laws began emerging in the 1990s and were enacted through reforms to electoral
laws and sometimes constitutions, as in the case of France. They now exist in over fifty
countries worldwide. Within advanced democracies, Italy, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal,
and Ireland have all passed gender quota laws, and more are considering them. Most of the
countries that pass quota laws are characterized by low levels of women’s representation
before the law is passed. The public explanation for passing the law in the first place is
overwhelmingly to increase women’s representation. Within advanced democracies, quotas
tend to be passed by countries with a strong tradition of Catholicism, a factor which is also
linked to traditional family policies and lower labor market outcomes for women (Castles
1994; Esping-Andersen 1990) – all of which are plausible underlying reasons for women’s
underrepresentation in office. Finally, quota laws are most often found in countries with
proportional representation, where they are much easier to implement than in single member
districts (Matland 2006; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2011).
Existing literature suggests several explanations for quota law adoption, and I focus on
four here – women’s movements, international influence, cross-partisan support, and party
quota ‘contagion’. First, women’s movements have been at the forefront of many quota
reforms, particularly in Latin America (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Htun 2016). When
women mobilize for change, their campaigns can be successful. For example, Poland’s recent
quota law (2011) originated from the Congress of Women, a meeting of more than 4,000
women from across Poland that turned into a social movement. The group spearheaded
a petition for gender parity which was eventually signed by over 150,000 Poles (Kroliczek
2012). A second explanation focuses on the role of international influence and transnational
2For literature on party quota adoption, please see: Kolinsky 1991; Matland and Studlar 1996; Caul 2001;
Bruhn 2003; Meier 2004; Kittilson 2006; Krook 2009.
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sharing. Quotas have spread rapidly over a relatively short period of time, and scholars
point to the exchange of information across national borders as a key reason (Krook, 2006,
2008; Hughes et al., 2015). Third, scholars suggest that it is only when women work together
across parties that quota reforms are successful – as in the cases of Argentina and Mexico
(Jones 1996; Baldez 2004; Htun 2016). Finally, previous research suggests that party quotas
can pave the way for legal quotas in a ‘mutual contagion effect’ whereby quotas beget quotas
as parties try to outdo each other (Meier 2004).
These accounts often do not fit cases in Western Europe very well. With the exception
of France (Murray 2012; Murray et al. 2012), there is little evidence that strong women’s
movements have been driving quota reforms. Quotas have been pushed through several
parliaments in Europe without cross-partisan support of women; in Spain and Portugal,
for example, women on the right voted against quotas (Valiente 2005; Verge 2012; Baum
and Esp´ırito-Santo 2012). While transnational sharing and influence does occur, at both
regional (e.g., the European Commission, the European Women’s Lobby) and global levels
(the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the
Beijing Platform for Action), this explanation is not able to distinguish why international
influence leads to quota reforms in some countries but not others. Quotas have not spread
to most of the countries influenced by these bodies, unlike in Latin America where they
have been adopted in nearly every country. Similarly, some countries without previous party
quotas have adopted quota laws (Ireland), and some countries with party quotas have never
adopted quota laws (Sweden, Germany). In fact, party quotas are so common in advanced
democracies that some argue this is a reason why newer quota laws are less popular in the
region – they are not needed (the opposite of the contagion argument; e.g., Krook et al.
2009).
While an important part of the causal story, accounts based on women’s movements,
international influence, cross-partisan support, and party quota ‘contagion’ alone cannot ex-
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plain what drives quota reforms across advanced democracies. Importantly, existing research
also cannot explain the puzzle of what motivates male elites to put these policies in place. In
particular, the low levels of women’s representation in most ‘quota countries’ before a quota
law is passed suggest that party elites had previously been indifferent to the problem. Their
embrace of controversial quota laws therefore should be explained rather than assumed.
Only a few studies have focused specifically on the incentives of male party elites to
adopt a quota law. Accounts from Argentina, the first country to pass a quota law, suggest
that President Menem supported it in order to gain women’s votes and ‘close a gender gap
suffered by the Peronists in relation to the opposition UCR party’ (Htun 2016, p. 56), while
at the same time shoring up his legacy on women’s rights (see also Jones 1996; Krook 2009;
Driscoll and Krook 2012). In Mexico, Baldez (2004) also finds a strong electoral motivation
for quotas, but in this case not so much to claim credit from female voters as to avoid
backlash for failing to support it. Interviews with party leaders on the right reveal that fear
of public retribution at the polls drove support even when male politicians were ideologically
opposed. Further, she suggests that quotas offer other strategic advantages, namely helping
party leaders consolidate control over the nomination process. Quotas can be a mechanism
for party leaders to protect their own interests, and Baldez proposes that leaders are most
likely to resort to them in contexts of electoral uncertainty (p. 234).
In France, Fre´chette, Maniquet and Morelli (2008) argue that male deputies voted to pass
a quota law because they anticipated a male bias in the electorate. Passing a gender quota law
would thus give them an increased advantage in the (short term) future, when they would be
more likely to come up against a female newcomer. Contesting this interpretation, Murray,
Krook, and Opello (2012) highlight the role of party elites rather than deputies. They argue
that individual legislators had little power to change the policy; instead, party discipline is
strong and leaders were able to compel the parliamentary party to vote together. Focusing on
the motivations of party leaders, they find that several different factors – ideology, electoral
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incentives and strategic gain – can lead to support for a quota law. For example, the leader
of the mainstream right, Chirac, exerted considerable pressure on his male-dominated party
to vote for the law despite their ideological opposition because he had publicly committed to
the principle of parity in a debate sponsored by women’s groups. The growing media profile
of the issue meant that voting against it would have ‘embarrassed Chirac and reinforced the
image of the RPR as old-fashioned and sexist’ (Murray et al. 2012, p. 11). Again, electoral
considerations are paramount.
These studies make valuable contributions to our knowledge of the process of quota
reform within Argentina, Mexico, and France, strongly pointing to the importance of elec-
toral incentives. However, they do not identify the general conditions under which electoral
incentives compel male party leaders to back quota reforms. For example, are positive elec-
toral incentives (credit claiming) more powerful than negative ones (fear of retribution), and
doesn’t the nature of the electoral challenge matter? Existing studies also cannot tell us
much about why parties facing little electoral uncertainty sometimes push through quota
laws. Finally, because they restrict their attention to single cases in which quota reform
occurs, these studies are unable to make inferences about the extent to which the causal
processes they describe apply more broadly (Gerring 2006b; Seawright and Gerring 2008).
This article uses a comparison of ‘most similar’ cases – similar on background characteristics
except for quota adoption – to explore the motivations and role of male party elites in quota
reform. In the next section I build on these studies from gender and politics, as well as the
literature on endogenous institutions, to propose an explanation that is later tested in case
study analysis.
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Intra- and Inter-Party Competition
Why would male party leaders support national quota legislation? One reason might be
ideology – they think it’s the right thing to do. Just as female gender does not guarantee
support for feminism, male gender does not preclude it. Commitment to gender equality
has been a longstanding element of socialist and other left party ideology (Duverger 1955;
Kittilson 2006). Yet, if parties are ideologically committed to women’s representation, why
not choose the same number of women candidates directly, or by passing a party quota?
Passing a law imposes the quota on all parties. While this implies greater potential policy
impact – more women are likely to be elected overall – it also poses some risks. Namely,
the party is likely to lose ownership of the issue if all parties implement a quota, and thus a
unique electoral selling point.
One explanation, adapted from the literature on endogenous institutions, is that for a
quota to be necessary in the first place there must be some resistance inside the party orga-
nization to nominating women. In particular, local level opposition to a party quota might
render it ineffective even if party leadership is genuinely committed to equality. I call this
explanation intra-party competition. The idea of national party leaders using institutional
change to quash intra-party conflict has parallels in the literature on early democratization.
In the case of Britain, Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argue that national political elites wanted
more spending on public goods, but corrupt local party opposition made it difficult to im-
plement. National level politicians expanded the suffrage in order to shift power at the local
level, because particularistic politics became less feasible with larger constituencies. Iversen
and Soskice (2007) expand on their argument, suggesting that extending the franchise, as
opposed to simply having a legislative majority, offers elites a long-term solution to the
collective action problem posed by the political entrenchment of local elites.
Another example comes from the literature on primary adoption, where the puzzle is
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again why party leaders would pass a law that involves giving away power. One of the
most powerful tools of party leaders is the ability to appoint candidates, so why would they
relinquish this willingly? Here, too, literature suggests that intra-party competition is a key
mechanism for reform. Specifically, party leaders will pass primaries in order to avoid costly
internal conflicts or splits (Kemahlioglu et al. 2009; Hortala-Vallve and Mueller 2015; Arago´n
2014). Because they are public and more inclusive than other candidate selection methods,
primaries can limit ongoing challenges to nominees and potentially prevent factions from
breaking away (Kemahlioglu et al. 2009). While the focus here is not specifically on local-
national party conflict, the same general theme of using an institutional reform to resolve
internal party power struggles applies.
Similarly, quota laws could provide national political elites with strategic advantages in
the context of intra-party competition. Quota laws give party leaders a way to shift power
at the local level, towards the more diverse demographics they value (either for ideological
reasons, or to appease vocal women in the party / end internal party conflict). Previous
studies from gender and politics have also identified the issue of local-national party conflict,
noting that national leaders are more concerned with women’s representation and equality
than local or regional party branches (Matland and Studlar 1996; Hinojosa 2012). In her
work, Hinojosa shows that the dominance of local party monopolies, which elect to preserve
their own power rather than advance national party goals, are one of the biggest barriers
for women’s selection as candidates in Mexico and Chile (Hinojosa 2012). Adopting quotas
is one of the strategies she recommends for overcoming local power monopolies. Similarly,
Bruhn’s analysis of the case of Mexico suggests that male elites who care little about a quota
can be motivated by the desire to enforce party decisions (Bruhn 2003). Finally, in her model
of motivations for quota implementation, Murray (2007) also highlights the importance of
maintaining internal party unity in strategic decision-making.
A quota law forces the hands of local party leaders, who can have significant power over
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candidate nominations. This is likely especially in the context of decentralized candidate
selection. Thus, I expect:
Hypothesis 1: Quota laws are likely to be supported and passed by parties character-
ized by decentralized candidate selection processes, and national-local conflicts over candidate
selection.
Building on the previous literature (Baldez 2004; Murray et al. 2012), another reason
male leaders might pass a quota law is electoral incentives – to gain votes from women, or
to put competitors at a disadvantage. While parties might lose the distinction of being the
only one/s to have a quota, they gain the distinction of being the one/s to pass legislation
on the issue. This can help distinguish them from parties further to the left, while at the
same time putting parties on the right at a competitive disadvantage.
The broader concept of contagion theory is relevant here. Contagion theory suggests that
political parties can feel pressured to nominate more women if others begin doing so (whether
these parties have voluntary quotas or not). Recent work points out that it is important to
consider the conditions and context in which contagion occurs (Cowell-Meyers 2011). I argue
that contagion leading to a quota law is facilitated by the condition of electoral threat from
the left. As Matland and Studlar note, “parties will feel pressured to nominate more women
if one of their political rivals, usually a smaller party farther to the left, starts to promote
representation of women” (Matland and Studlar 1996, p. 707). Heightened competition
renders ruling groups vulnerable, making somewhat risky or uncertain policy reforms, like a
quota law, more attractive. For instance, Teele (2017) finds that high political competition
increases the probability of a state passing equal suffrage for women.
There are also strategic advantages to be gained vis-a-vis the right. By forcing parties
with few women in their ranks (typically, those on the right) to promote female candidates,
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they place these parties at a competitive disadvantage because they will have to scramble to
find more new candidates. The flip side of this logic is that it alleviates any concerns parties
considering party-internal quotas might have that they will put themselves at a disadvantage
(at least initially). As an example, party officials in France openly speculated that having
to field unknown women candidates would certainly result in losses (Murray 2007, p. 571).
In one stroke, a mainstream left party can claim women voters back from the encroaching
party on their left, and also put right-wing competitors at a disadvantage. I thus expect:
Hypothesis 2: Quota laws are likely to be supported and passed by parties characterized
by declining vote share relative to a new, more progressive (especially in terms of women’s
representation) competitor.
Figure 1 presents a visual depiction of the main argument, using a table of scenarios
and predictions for each situation. The top row of Figure 1 considers the outcome when a
party faces a threat from the left. It shows that a quota law is more effective at stopping
electoral losses than a party quota because it also requires right-wing parties to comply
(Hypothesis 2 ). This equalizes the costs of finding new candidates across all parties. This
scenario is applicable mainly to the mainstream left, as the party most likely to lose voters
to the left on gender issues. These far left challengers are likely to be ‘New Left’ parties (e.g.,
radical left or Green parties), which have been trailblazers with regards to gender equality
promotion and equality guarantees (Keith and Verge 2016). The middle and bottom rows
consider the situation when there is no threat from the left, and this applies to both left-
and right-wing parties. In this scenario the impetus for a quota law is not directly tied
to current electoral incentives, but the desire to shift demographics within the party. This
might be due to ideological reasons, or pressure from women’s sections in the party which are
causing internal-party conflict. Here, a quota law is only likely if parties are weak, making
12
Party Response
Party Quota Quota Law
Competition
Threat from Left
Context
Stop loss to Left, Stop loss to
but potential loss to
Right
Left and Right
=⇒ (Hypothesis 2 )
No threat from Left
Weak party: Weak party:
Ineffective Effective
=⇒ (Hypothesis 1 )
Strong party: Strong party:
Effective Effective
Figure 1: Party Incentives to Adopt a Quota Law
an internal party quota ineffective. For weak parties, a law provides the only effective way
to implement a quota (Hypothesis 1 ).
The remainder of this article tests this argument by tracing the evolution of quota reforms
in two countries that passed a quota law, Belgium and Portugal, and two paired countries
that did not, Austria and Italy. The next section explains case selection and methodology.
Case Selection and Methods
I use matched pair case studies to test my argument for two main reasons. First, ‘most
similar’ cases can serve as mutual counterfactuals. They provide a framework for thinking
about what would have happened, all else equal, if a key treatment variable had not occurred
(Tarrow 2010). Second, matched pairs also unpack the process by which outcomes came
about in each case (George and Bennett 2005; Tarrow 2010). This parallel process tracing
provides important leverage for exploring causal mechanisms, which are often complex. Elite
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incentives are a case in point – it would be very difficult to quantify and operationalize
such a variable for quantitative analysis. One potential problem with using interview data
is that interviewees might not report accurate information, perhaps because they would
like to portray their actions in a more positive light (Mosley 2013). While this misgiving
can never be totally overcome, I note that it biases findings against my main arguments
(which are related to strategic motivations), in favor of ideological motivations. The fact
that interviewees are often willing to make claims about the strategic motivations of their
own parties is good evidence that they are speaking frankly. I further control for this
‘measurement error’ by being careful to convey any divergences in opinion and checking for
confirmation of claims across segments of the sample frame (e.g., different parties).
I selected the ‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal because these countries are of
particular interest: in both a quota law was adopted, but in very different contexts and
time periods. Belgium was one of the first countries in Europe to pass a quota law, and
Portugal one of the most recent. In Belgium the law was passed with support from the
mainstream left and right, while in Portugal the law was supported only by the mainstream
left. I then used statistical matching to select pairs for Belgium and Portugal. These pairs
are similar in most respects, especially with regards to observable determinants of adopting
a quota law, except no quota law was adopted. I use statistical matching because it offers
a transparent and principled way to select cases when there are many relevant variables
(Nielsen 2014). Matching ensures that the cases are really the most similar cases available.
Many methodologists advocate matching as a viable way of selecting paired cases (Gerring
2006a; Seawright and Gerring 2008; Nielsen 2014; Tarrow 2010), and although it is a relatively
new technique a growing number of studies employ it (Madrigal et al. 2011; Genovese et al.
2014; Glynn and Ichino 2014; Lyall 2014).
I match on six variables identified as potential determinants of quota adoption: percent-
age of women in parliament, proportional representation, economic development, women’s
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labor force participation, percentage of parties with voluntary quotas (weighted by seat share
in parliament), and percentage of population Catholic (1980). The matching procedure suc-
cessfully identifies Austria as a pair for Belgium and Italy as a pair for Portugal. Appendix
A provides further details about the matching procedure, including a discussion of the se-
lection of matching variables, similarities and differences between the countries, and a table
showing the data used.
I have extra confidence in the matches because in both cases a quota law was proposed in
the shadow country around the same time as in country with which it was paired. In Austria
a quota law was proposed by the national parliament in 1996, not long after Belgium’s quota
was adopted in 1994, but it failed to pass (Ko¨pl 2005). Italy was on the verge of passing
a national quota law in 2005, right before Portugal passed its quota law in 2006, but it
failed. Italy has since passed a quota law (in 2015, after I carried out interviews in the
country), which will come into force in the next election. This suggests that the covariates I
match on should be considered appropriate determinants of quota adoption, and lends extra
confidence to the general matching procedure. Another benefit of analyzing these four cases
in particular is that they are comparatively understudied in the literature, which tends to
focus on developing countries.
I conducted fieldwork in each of the four countries in 2013 and 2014. These interviews
focused on why quota laws were adopted, or why quota proposals had not been successful. I
used a non-random strategy to select interviewees, deliberately choosing subjects who could
offer the best evidence about the politics of the quota debate and adoption. This includes
party leaders, cabinet members, politicians from all major parties, and women’s movement
activists. I interviewed 61 individuals, representing a response rate of just under 50%. 12
men and 49 women were interviewed, a gender imbalance that reflects women’s dispropor-
tionate interest and involvement in quota legislation. I was able to speak to male party
leaders in both ‘treated’ countries, Belgium and Portugal. The majority of interviews were
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semi-structured, focusing on the reasons for party support / opposition to quota legislation.
Following best practice for interview research in political science (Bleich and Pekkanen 2013),
full details about the sampling procedure and interview research methods, including a table
of all interviews sought, obtained, and declined, are included in Appendix B. In the following
sections, I test my argument first in the cases of Belgium and Austria, where quota proposals
emerged in the 1990s, and then in Portugal and Italy, where quotas came on the agenda in
the 2000s.
Belgium and Austria: Subverting Local Party Monopolies
Gender quotas in Belgium started within political parties. Belgian parties were among the
first to adopt voluntary quotas for women in their internal rules. The Flemish Liberals
(VLD) had quota provisions in place from 1985 until the party’s disbandment in 1993, and
the Flemish Christian Democrats had them from 1975, although not at the federal level.
The Greens and Social Democrats also had quotas in place from the early 1990s, amongst
others. In most of these parties, however, quotas were not popular. Getting internal pro-
visions passed involved long, difficult debates. The Secretary-General of the Flemish Social
Democrat’s women’s section (Zij-kant) Vera Claes explains, “There was a lot of opposition
from the men. They didn’t recognize the use of it, or the democratic need.”3 Even when
internal provisions were successfully passed, women within the party noted that the changes
made were not enough, and that they didn’t work well (in terms of electing women).
The first parliamentary bill proposing a national gender quota law was introduced in 1980
(for local lists only), and it was rejected by the courts due to concerns about discrimination.
It was followed by another unsuccessful bill in 1991, which would have applied to all elections.
This time elections were called before the bill came up. Both were introduced by female
Christian Democrats – Paula D’Hondt and Trees Merckx, respectively (Meier 2012). The
3Vera Claes, personal interview, 10 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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quota law finally passed in 1994, supported by a coaliton of Flemish- and French-speaking
Christian and Social Democrats. The law requires that no more than two-thirds of an
electoral list may consist of candidates of the same sex (since increased to 50%), and lists
that do not comply are not accepted.4 The legislation was opposed by the Greens, who
felt that it was too weak, and the liberals and far right, who argued that it was artificial
protectionism, and prioritized sex over merit.5 Most parties voted together, but there were
some abstentions on the right. Notably, the majority of the Flemish nationalist party VU
abstained.6
For the Christian Democrats, support for the bill originated from women’s frustrated
attempts to create change within their party. Even when internal provisions were successfully
passed, women within the party noted that the quotas were minimal, and ineffective at
increasing the number of women. Flemish Christian Democrat Senator Sabine de Bethune
recalled that in the early 1990s she campaigned, with the women’s section of her party, to
increase the size of the quota within the party statutes. At the time 1/5 of local party list
positions were reserved for women, and de Bethune pushed for this to be increased to 1/3.
She recounts giving a speech to the party Congress in 1993 in support of this amendment
and facing vocal opposition from male local party leaders, who controlled list selection and
made up the majority of voters in the party Congress. Her amendment was rejected. De
Bethune describes:
Then we [the women] all stood up and left the Congress, and they had to stop
and the Congress was finished. It was on all the news, the main points of political
news of the year – the great Congress for renewal of the party was broken, finished,
because the women walked out. Many men left also, hundreds left the place. It
4Law of 24 May 1994 ‘on promoting balanced distribution of men and women on the lists of candidates
for the elections’. Belgisch Staatsblad. 1 July 1994; Law of 13 December 2002 ‘on various changes to the
electoral law’. Belgisch Staatsblad. 10 January 2003.
5Report of the Committee of the Interior, Chambre des Repre´sentants de Belgique. Session Ordinaire
1993-1994, 24 Mars 1994.
6Chambre des Repre´sentants de Belgique. Seance Pleniere, 31 Mars 1994. PLEN 31.03.94.
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was a very dramatic moment. The women then thought, if we cannot change the
party, we will change it in the law.7
An article from Le Soir dated June 7, 1993 confirms the ‘revolt of women’ at the party
Congress. Women only returned after talks with the President of the party, who expressed
support for the quota proposal.8 De Bethune went on to help draft the text of the quota bill
that became law in 1994, working in the Cabinet of then Minister of Labor, Employment,
and Equal Opportunities Miet Smet, who co-sponsored the legislation. Smet is quoted in the
Le Soir article: “Men always say that they are for the principle of granting places to women.
They would even offer 50% of the positions! But when it comes to voting ... Following this
incident [at the party Congress], it was decided to submit the problem to a working group
and to find a solution...”
Support from male party leaders was crucial. The other co-sponsor of the law was Louis
Tobback, a Flemish Social Democrat and then Minister of the Interior, and it was also
backed by the Prime Minister, Flemish Christian Democrat Jean-Luc Dehaene. Dehaene
personally met with relevant party presidents (those in the majority) to ask them to push
the bill through parliament.9 Male support can be explained partially by women within
the party lobbying them for change. Within the Flemish Christian Democrats, Smet was
considered the driving force – ‘her engagement and her absolute combativeness’ pushing the
legislation forward through many obstacles.10 Smet was very close to male party leaders,
notably Prime Ministers Martens (whom she later married) and Dehaene, because they all
came from the youth group of the party at the same time, and because her father was a
Senator. According to women’s activists, this strong party ‘heritage’ gave her a very good
negotiating position.11 Majority-male backbenchers went along because of party discipline,
7Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
8Dubuisson, Martine. “Parti macho? Les femmes en cole`re...” Le Soir, 7 June 1993.
9Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
10Eveline Cortier and Kitty Roggeman, personal interview, 3 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
11Eveline Cortier and Kitty Roggeman, personal interview, 3 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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but also because the law stipulated a gradual implementation, moving from a 25% threshold
in the first election to 33% thereafter.
Still, the question remains: why would male party leaders (and not only Flemish Christian
Democrats) favor quota legislation, given it could put their own political positions at risk?
Ideology played a role, but so did strategic concerns. Party leaders saw the quota as a way
to bring the party more in line with ideals of democracy and increase their control over
candidate selection at the same time. Tobback likened the legislation to women’s suffrage,
noting his party had ‘commited the stupidity’ of voting against the women’s vote in the
1940s and shouldn’t make the same mistake twice. He notes, “There’s one thing that you
cant deny: if you don’t consider that women are more stupid than men or less qualified than
men, and so on, then one has to conclude that there is something wrong.”12
Flemish Social Democrat MP Renaat Landuyt explained that the law was part of a wider
movement to strengthen democracy in Belgium given the rise of extremist parties in the early
1990s. He says, “the atmosphere in these years was that there was an upcoming extremist
party and there were difficulties in our democracy, and the reaction was that we have to
get farther on with gender and race. And that’s the structural reason that we have had
this legislation at that time.”13 Other interviewees also placed the impetus on democracy,
noting that gender balance is very much in line with broader democratic ideals in Belgium,
a country with a rich history of legislation requiring representation for different language
groups.14
The law also gave national party leaders an excuse to exercise more control over candidate
selection, shaping the party to their preferred – most electable – demographic make-up.
Candidate selection in most parties in Belgium (including those that supported a quota law)
12Louis Tobback, personal interview, 20 September 2013, Leuven, Belgium.
13Renaat Landuyt, personal interview, 23 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
14Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium; see also Lijphart 2012;
Meier 2004
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was (and is) largely controlled by subnational party organizations, subject to national party
approval (Bille 2001). Landuyt explains that party leaders used the law as “an argument
to rearrange their own parties” in the face of a perceived democratic deficit and local party
organizations unwilling to change. “The party leaders want to have a certain influence and
they have more influence to make a law than to make the lists for the elections. So, they
used the law to have more power to make better lists.”15 The same sentiment was expressed
by Flemish Social Democrat Vera Claes, who suggested that this legislation was interesting
for party leaders because, “they could easily say you [men] should be replaced now because
there’s the law.”16 The candidate selection procedures did not change in Belgium, but leaders
were able to influence (“regenerate”17) the composition of lists.
The other side of this argument is that imposing the law on all parties mitigated concerns
that it would result in electoral losses for the supporting parties, at least initially. De Bethune
explains, “they [men who opposed the law] said we would have a handicap compared to other
parties, and at least for one election this would be a problem, candidates need some time
to get strong. The party was a little bit afraid of this forced renewal. We said OK, then
we would force everyone to do it... it is a question of democracy, we will force everyone to
do it.”18 French Social Democrat Yvan Mayeur concurs that this was a motivation for his
party to support a quota law, rather than only internal party quotas:
OK [if] we do that [implement a gender quota] but the other parties don’t do
that, we can be in difficulty in one region or another because the popularity of
the man is the result of the history of that region. So if we change that man
for a woman, it is not only a question of experience, it is a question of known or
unknown by the people... So we said, OK, that means that maybe through the
law we can impose that to all the parties. That means that everybody will be in
the same situation.19
15Renaat Landuyt, personal interview, 23 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
16Vera Claes, personal interview, 10 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
17Renaat Landuyt, personal interview, 23 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
18Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
19Yvan Mayeur, personal interview, 17 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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The Belgian case offers little support for the hypothesis that parties adopted quota leg-
islation in order to win over female voters from a growing left-wing party. The Christian
Democrats were the largest party in the early 1990s, followed by the Social Democrats. Vote
shares for both parties were slightly down on the previous election (1987 to 1991), but this
was largely the result of a rising far right, not the left. The Greens gained only marginally
in this time period. When asked whether the Christian Democrats might have had electoral
motives for the quota legislation, interviewees from across parties disagreed with the notion.
Many volunteered that the they were comfortably in power at this time, and that they were
particularly strong on the women’s vote.20
Table 1 summarizes key variables related to intra- and inter-party competition and quota
support in Belgium and Austria: for inter-party competition, each party’s vote share and
change in vote share in the previous election, and for intra-party competition, each party’s
candidate selection procedure. The share of women in each party and use of party quotas is
also noted, along with whether the party supported quota legislation. Table 1 shows that the
coalition of parties backing a quota law (Flemish and French Christian and Social Democrats)
all had decentralized candidate selection procedures. They were either completely decentral-
ized, meaning national party leaders have no control over the lists, or decentralized subject
to national party approval, meaning that lists are composed by local leaders but national
leaders can occasionally exert influence over them. Table 1 also shows that parties support-
ing a quota won the largest share of votes in the previous election (1991), and did not face
a serious challenge from the two parties on the far left (Ecolo and Agalav), which grew an
average of 1.5% in vote share from 1987 to 1991. Instead, the far right posed a more serious
threat, with a growth of nearly 5% in the same period. The widespread use of decentralized
candidate selection procedures in Belgium provided a compelling incentive for male party
20Gerolf Annemans, personal interview, 9 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium; Yvan Mayeur, personal in-
terview, 17 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium; Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013,
Brussels, Belgium; Vera Claes, personal interview, 10 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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leaders to adopt a quota law in order to make intra-party gains.
Like Belgium, parties in Austria are familiar with internal gender quota provisions. The
Greens and the Social Democrats (SPO¨) have had voluntary quotas since 1986, and the
mainstream right (O¨VP) has had an informal quota (not in party statutes) since 1995.
While the Greens often have over 50% women in parliament, the SPO¨ and O¨VP typically
do not meet their own targets. A quota law was proposed in the national parliament in
1996, which would have made part of the public funding for political parties contingent on
an equal share of men and women in the parliamentary party. After considerable debate,
the bill was finally rejected in 1999. The bill was sponsored by the Greens, and initially
supported by women across the mainstream left (SPO¨) and right (O¨VP). However, in the
final debate women in both mainstream parties spoke out against the bill, and voted along
with their parties to reject it (Ko¨pl 2005).
Since then, the issue of legislated gender quotas for politics has come up in public debate
several times, typically instigated by the Green party. Notably, a 2009 parliamentary inquiry
on the state of women in politics in Austria featured many arguments in favor of a quota
law.21 At the time of this inquiry, the President of the parliament, Barbara Prammer (SPO¨)
came out in favor of a 50% quota for women in parliament. Other women within the
Socialist party have also joined the Greens in openly supporting quota legislation in recent
years. Yet, quota legislation remains off the table in Austria. Can the role of intra- and
inter-party competition help us make sense of why quota legislation failed in Austria?
Taking intra-party competition first, the argument suggests that male party elites would
support national quota legislation if it helps them to take control over candidate selection
within their own party. In Austria, this is unlikely to be a strong motivator for party leaders.
This is because the proportional electoral system requires parties to present three separate
21“Frauen in der Politik mehr Frauen in die Politik!” Parlamentarische Enquete des Nationalrates
Mittwoch. 7 October 2009. 1/VER XXIV. GP - Stenographisches Protokoll.
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candidate lists for national parliament: a list for the district, the region, and a nationwide
list. Seats are allocated according to votes first at the district level, and then remainders
are used to assign seats according to the regional and national lists. While the local party
typically has considerable decision-making power at the district level (Bille 2001), the central
party still maintains ability to compose the national lists. As Table 1 shows, national leaders
maintain more control over candidate selection procedures in Austria than in Belgium. In
the three largest parties, candidate lists are either composed by national party leaders (SPO¨)
or subject to national party approval (O¨VP, and FPO¨).
In the SPO¨, the result is that the party can use the national lists to ensure (near)
compliance with the internal gender quota. According to the head of the SPO¨ women’s
section Andrea Brunner, many of the women come from the national level list: “So if the
bottom two levels [of candidate lists] have more men normally, the national level has to take
more women into the parliament from the national list. So most of them come from there.”22
For example, of the 18 SPO¨ women elected in 2013, 50% came from district lists, 33% from
regional lists, and 16% from the national list. The same figures for SPO¨ men are 68% district
lists, 21% regional lists, and 11% the national list.23 Parties in Austria are able to overcome
local-level opposition to candidate diversification without resorting to legislation.
Turning to inter-party competition, there is little evidence that a growing far left posed
a challenge to the SPO¨. As Table 1 shows, in the election preceding the quota law proposal
(1995) the SPO¨ was the largest party in parliament, winning the plurality of votes, although
not a majority. As in Belgium, the Green party was not particularly strong at the time but
the far right (FPO¨) was growing quickly. The SPO¨ thus continued its ‘grand coalition’ with
the O¨VP, a partnership that has governed Austria together for the majority of the post-war
period. The O¨VP are ideologically opposed to quotas, and for this reason the SPO¨ also
22Andrea Brunner, personal interview, 22 April 2014, Vienna, Austria.
23Figures calculated from national parliament website, www.parlament.gv.at.
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voted against the bill. According to longtime SPO¨ politician Irmtraut Karlsson, the SPO¨
voted against the quota bill, “Because they are in coalition with the conservatives, and this
issue is not important enough for that. They are not going to break the coalition for that.”24
‘Free votes’ (votes of conscience) were not permitted, according to Karlsson.
The constraints of coalition government still bind the SPO¨ today. In 2014 the spokesper-
son for the the Minister for Women, Gabriele Heinisch-Hosek, said of a quota for women
in politics, “My minister thinks that all these ideas are worth considering, but the problem
is again that the O¨VP just doesn’t really have an interest in doing that.”25 While some
women within the O¨VP have come out in favor of a quota law, “large parts [of the party] are
against it and will keep the debate down.”26 In the absence of compelling incentives for male
party leaders to gain further control over candidate selection, or to compete with a rising
left-wing party, the quota law in Austria was rejected. Yet the Greens have been growing in
popularity since the 1990s, gaining 12% of the vote in the last parliamentary election (2013)
and winning the presidential election for the first time in 2016. If the success of the Greens
continues, it could well push the SPO¨ to prioritize a quota in order to compete for women
voters.
An interesting question is, what if the SPO¨ had not been in government with the Con-
servatives – would party leaders have supported a quota law? Even absent a challenge on
the left, the gains to be made by putting the right at a temporary disadvantage in having to
find and field new candidates could be compelling. In theory, inter-party motivation could
come from competition with either the left or the right. In the case of Austria, the presence
of a strong and rising far right party makes this unlikely. The SPO¨ needed to keep its voters
away from the FPO¨, and has attempted to do so by for example stressing its restrictive
immigration policy (Mu¨ller 2000). FPO¨ voters are predominantly male, and the party has
24Irmtraut Karlsson, personal interview, 12 May 2014, Vienna, Austria.
25Julia Valsky, personal interview, 5 May 2014, Vienna, Austria.
26Anonymous (SPO¨ Minister’s aide), personal interview, 18 April 2014, Vienna, Austria.
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many times spoken out against gender quotas as anti-democratic and a distraction from real
problems (Givens 2004).27 In the context of the electorate’s overall swing to the right, the
SPO¨ would be unlikely to pass a quota even if it were not constrained by coalition govern-
ment. This brief thought experiment suggests that party strategy towards gender quotas
depends on the location of its competitors across the spectrum. I note that additional case
studies would be necessary to explore cases where parties might be motivated by competition
with the mainstream right, absent a strong far right party.
In summary, the main incentives for male elites to support a quota law in Belgium were
1) to overcome intra-party competition about candidate selection, and 2) to ensure that
a quota would not put their own parties at an initial disadvantage, by imposing the law
on all parties. The strong role of women in the parties (the impetus for the quota law in
the first place) was thus complemented by conditions – decentralized candidate selection
and entrenched local party monopolies – that gave male party leaders strategic reasons to
support the law. In Austria, where the tiered electoral system gives central party leaders
considerable control over candidate selection and electoral competition on the left has been
muted, a quota reform was rejected.
Portugal and Italy: The Influence of a Growing Far Left
In Portugal, the debate about a quota law was a partisan issue. The two main parties on the
left, the Socialist party (PS) and the Left Bloc (BE) had both instituted quotas for women
within their own parties from the late 1990s. The new left party the Left Bloc had quotas
from its founding, with no great debate about it.28 In the PS conversely, women within the
party struggled for many years to get a quota passed. Eventually in 1995 then party leader
Anto´nio Guterres imposed an internal quota, against the will of most of the party according
27See, e.g.: “Verzicht auf Quoten wa¨re Ru¨ckschritt in der Demokratie”, Der Standard, 5 November 2008.
28Luis Fazenda, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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to MP and former President of the PS women’s section So´nia Fertuzinhos. Fertuzinhos
recalls that Guterres believed in this agenda: “he was influenced by women’s groups, and
he gave them strength, supported them.”29 While the internal quota proved difficult to
implement at first (“it had not really worked,” claimed PS MEP Ana Gomes30), by the
mid-2000s things had changed. Fertuzinhos says that while the party was still patriarchal,
the leadership – notably then-party leader Jose´ So´crates – continued to push the issue as a
question of democratic legitimacy.
By 2005, 29% of the PS party’s MPs were women, slightly above the self-imposed 25%
party quota, and 50% of the Left Bloc’s MPs were women. The two main parties on the right,
the Social Democrats (PSD) and Democratic and Social Center – People’s Party (CDS-PP)
boasted a less-impressive 8% female MPs each at the time (Commission 2007). The two left
parties joined together in proposing a law. As in the case of Belgium, this was not the first
time a quota law had been proposed in parliament. Bills for a quota law were introduced in
1998, 2000, and 2003 by Socialist party members, and in 2001 and 2003 by the Left Bloc.
All of these bills were rejected due to the opposition of the (majority) right-wing parties, the
PSD and the CDS-PP.
The 2006 bill initially required a minimum of 33% representation of both genders on
party lists, candidates must alternate by gender (no more than two of the same sex in
consecutive order), and parties that do not comply cannot submit lists. The PS and BE
jointly supported this bill, which was published as a decree in 2006. The decree was then
vetoed by the President, who objected to the strict sanctions for non-compliance. A revised
bill, which changed the penalties to financial sanctions, was proposed. At this point the
BE declined to support the bill, claiming the sanctions were too weak. The PS used its
majority in parliament to push through the legislation without additional support (Baum
29So´nia Fertuzinhos, personal interview, 22 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
30Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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and Esp´ırito-Santo 2012).31
Why would these parties support national quota legislation, given their internal party
quotas seemed to be relatively effective? Candidate selection in Portugal, as in Belgium, is
influenced by subnational party organizations. Again, problems for women are seen to loom
largest at the local level, where lists are prone to being “hijacked by local party leaders”,
in the words of PS MEP Ana Gomes.32 Yet, the PS party statues state that the National
Political Commission (the central party leadership) can nominate candidates for 30% of
winnable positions in each district, including their rank order (Verge and Esp´ırito-Santo
2016). This explains why the PS’ internal party quota had been effective at achieving its
target of 25%, and also why PS male backbenchers had no problem voting for the law (they
were no longer at risk). Table 2, which presents key variables related to intra- and inter-
party competition in Portugal and Italy, shows that the majority of parties in Portugal are
characterized by centralized control over party lists. Thus, the main motivation for male
party leaders to pass a quota in Portugal was unlikely related to intra-party competition.
Male and female quota supporters in Portugal framed their case in terms of advancing
democracy, in particular after the dictatorship when women’s roles in public life were severely
restricted. The law was originally packaged as part of a broader set of reforms to increase
political participation and democracy, including a term limit measure for mayors.33 The
government pushed forward a plan to ‘modernize’ the state, including not only political
participation but also bureaucracy and infrastructure (Lisi 2010). Male party leaders of the
PS also viewed the quota legislation as a way to distinguish the party from competitors,
gaining an electoral advantage. PS Minister Augusto Santos Silva says of the quota bill:
On one hand we could differentiate more the Socialist party from the center-right
party PSD that is very akin to the PS in terms of financial issues, European issues,
31Organic Law 3/2006 ‘Lei da paridade’, DR I serie No.160/X/1 2006.08.21, 21 August 2006.
32Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
33Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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defense, foreign affairs. . . so there, we could have a rather clear differentiation
between left and right in Portugal. And on the other hand we could conquer some
electorate, more urban and younger electorate, and of course the new profession-
als, more educated, young women, we could steal them from the new extreme
left party that is called the Left Bloc (BE).34
The Socialist party in fact gained significant ground in the election just prior to the quota
law, increasing its vote share from 38% in 2002 to 46% in 2005 (see Table 2). However, this
was entirely at the expense of the outgoing right-wing government (PSD and CDS-PP), which
was blamed for poor economic performance. 2005 marked increased success for the new far
left party the Left Bloc, which won 6% of the vote and 8 seats in parliament (up from 2% and
2 seats in 2002). The growing success of this new party posed a threat, particularly as the
party captured a predominantly young, urban vote (Lobo 2001). Previous research suggests
that the PS competed with the BE on gender equality issues: “...[the PS] implemented its
own voluntary gender quota in 1999 in part to keep up with the BE, which appeared more
progressive on this and other equality issues at the time.” (Baum and Esp´ırito-Santo 2012, p.
335). Additionally, the distance between the two main parties in Portugal (the PS and PSD)
is small relative to other Western European countries (Freire 2006), and clarity about the
policy alternatives presented by parties is low (Freire 2008; Freire and Belchior 2013). Both
are considered ‘catch-all’ parties, finding support in many social groups – including farmers,
industrial workers, and rural and urban middle class (Veiga and Veiga 2004). In a study of
the 2005 election, Freire and Lobo (2006) state that the PS “had problems differentiating
itself from the PSD in many policy areas” (p. 585).
Still, Silva’s view is extreme. Most politicians interviewed were adamant that ideological
factors alone were the primary impetus for PS support of the quota law, along with the
history of the women’s section in the party fighting for the quota. A typical example comes
from PS MP Vitalino Canas, who says, “What motivated him [Socrates] was a matter of
34Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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justice. I think the defense of a quota system has no electoral impact, i.e., generally no
one wins or loses because of defending or rejecting a quota system.”35 Of course, it is
understandable that interviewees would want to present themselves and their parties in the
best possible light, so it could be that subjects are unwilling to speak frankly about strategic
incentives. Another possibility is that the political payoff for the left was more subtle. One
interviewee suggested that left-wing voters expect their parties to address these issues, even
if they are not the most politically salient: “We didn’t get more votes because we supported
parity, but I’m sure we would have less if we didn’t.”36 In conclusion, the role of inter-party
competition in Portugal – a growing far left party and policy convergence in the middle –
helped to facilitate the support and passage of a quota at this time.
Several parties on the left in Italy have had voluntary quotas for women at various points
in their history: the main center-left party (Democratic Party), the Communists, and the
Communist Refoundation Party (Caul 2001; Guadagnini 2005). Italy was also the first
country in Western Europe to pass a gender quota law in 1993, but it was repealed in 1995
by the (all-male) constitutional court. In place for only one election (1994), the 50% quota
applied to the 25% of the seats that were elected via proportional representation (Weeks
and Baldez 2015). Previous research suggests that one of the main reasons the quota law
passed in 1993 was the general assumption that it would be repealed – which is indeed
what happened (Guadagnini 2005). In 2003, Italian legislators passed an amendment to the
constitution that gives policy-makers the power to adopt measures to promote equal access
to elective bodies, opening the door for a quota law once more. Female political leaders from
across the political spectrum came together to support the amendment.
In 2005, a quota law was proposed in parliament as part of a bill to change the electoral
system. The quota was driven forward by center-right (Forza Italia) Minister of Equal
35Vitalino Canas, email correspondence, 17 October 2013.
36Luis Fazenda, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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Opportunities, Stefania Prestigiacomo, in a move that surprised many of her feminist critics
(Guadagnini 2005). The Minister engaged in a tense public battle against men in her own
party and coalition (a partnernship including Forza Italia and further right-wing parties
National Alliance and Lega Nord) as she pushed for the quota.37 The coalition of support
for the bill included women from across the political spectrum, including those who had
previously opposed quotas such as Alessandra Mussolini, granddaughter of the fascist leader.
Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Prime Minister at the time, claimed that he was
in favor of the quota. However, it is unclear whether his support was sincere, particularly
given the sexist explanation he gave that, “We would like women, most of all the beautiful
ones, in Parliament very much.”38 Berlusconi’s coalition partners were opposed, and he was
unwilling to take a stand for gender quotas at the expense of delaying the legislation to
change the electoral system.
What role did intra- and inter-party competition play in the Italian case of the failed
2005 quota law? First, the role of intra-party competition was likely minimal because Italian
parties maintained strong, centralized control of candidate selection at this time (see Table
2). Berlusconi famously handpicked candidates, and his coalition party leaders (especially
Alleanza Nazionale) also exercised direct control over nominations, rather than giving lo-
cal party branches influence (Ferrara 2004; Galasso and Nannicini 2011; Boeri et al. 2010).
A quota law thus offered little incentive for party leaders in terms of quashing intra-party
conflict. Second, inter-party competition was also unlikely to have been a compelling motiva-
tor. In the general election preceding the quota law (2001), Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition
gained over 90 seats in the lower house, at the expense of the mainstream left coalition and
the Communist Refoundation Party. There was no progressive, new left party emerging to
push parties to address gender equality issues. The quota was also not even agreed upon
37“Berlusconi-Prestigiacomo, scontro in Cdm.” La Corriere della Sera, 11 November 2005.
38“Anna, Aida e le atre: Silvio playboy per ragion di Stato.” Il Corriere della Sera, 20 Oct 2005. Author
translation.
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ideologically within the mainstream left. The Democratic Party did not comply with its
own internal-party quota at the time, and some men within the party spoke out against the
quota bill in parliament (Guadagnini 1998).39 Absent gains to be made in either intra- or
inter-party competition, male elites in Italy failed to prioritize the gender quota at this time.
The case of Italy offers a second opportunity to examine incentives for a quota law. Ten
years later, in 2015, a quota bill returned to the legislative agenda, again with a proposed
electoral law change initiated by the government. This time the proposal passed, but only
after a protracted debate and several amendments to strengthen the law failed in secret
votes. Matteo Renzi was the head of the Democratic Party and the government at the time,
and he made a point of emphasizing gender equality in the party. When Renzi was elected
to the head of the PD in 2013, he selected a majority of women for his new party board
(secretaria), saying, “I selected 5 men and 7 women, on the grounds that equal opportunities
are never enough.”40 He implemented an internal-party quota once more, and also appointed
Italy’s first parity cabinet as Prime Minister in 2014. While ideology, a commitment to
egalitarianism, might have been an important incentive, intra- and inter-party competition
also could have played compelling roles. In contrast to 2005, the context of 2015 Italy is one
in which many parties have given up centralized control of candidate selection, and – most
importantly – a rising far-left party threatens the mainstream.
As Table 2 shows, the Democratic Party (PD) and others on the left now use primaries to
select their candidates, signaling a move towards more democratic, inclusive parties (Hazan
and Rahat 2010). PD primary voters are able to signal two preferences, one for a man and
one for a woman. If the second preference is of the same gender, it is void. The party then
composes the closed lists with 50/50 gender representation and gender alternation in list
39Information about Democratic Party internal quotas from author’s interviews with Democratic Party
politicians: Valeria Valente, personal interview, 9 April 2014, Rome, Italy and Cecilia Guerra, personal
interview, 9 April 2014, Rome, Italy.
40“Renzi annuncia la nuova segreteria Pd: ‘5 uomini e 7 donne. C’e` anche Serracchiani’, Il Fatto Quotidi-
ano, 9 December 2013. Author translation.
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positions.41 In this context, a national quota law would give the PD party no additional
control over candidate selection, and indeed the party would not want this anyway.
While intra-party conflict over candidate selection is not a strong incentive for passing a
quota law, inter-party competition has become more fierce on the left. The 5 Star Movement
(M5S) burst onto the Italian political scene in 2009, and won the largest vote share of any
single party in 2013, ‘stealing’ 19% of the PD’s 2008 votes (as quoted in Bordignon 2014,
p.5). One PD politician remarked that M5S politicians are young and new, “and they
don’t have the institutional system of [party] power to change...they don’t have to destroy
the old ways that were built by all men.”42 Nearly one-third of its parliamentary party is
women, and the party is also on average the most youthful in parliament – but its voters
are disproportionately male (56%). Emphasizing gender equality through passing a quota
law could thus have strategic advantages for the PD, who need to retain young voters and
already have an advantage with women (55% of its voters).43 In the case of Italy, an absence
of strategic incentives to gain power within or between parties resulted in male elites failing
to support a quota in 2005; ten years later, in 2015, a significant challenge on the left
precipitated the passage of a quota in parliament.
In summary, little evidence suggests intra-party conflicts over candidate selection mo-
tivated male party elites to adopt a quota in Portugal. Instead, the timing points to the
key role of inter-party competition – namely, the PS’ struggle to distinguish itself from a
rising, socially progressive party on the left and their main opposition in the center. In Italy
conditions of strong, centralized control of party lists and a lackluster far left initially led
to the rejection of a quota law (2005), but a fast-growing far left movement threatening the
mainstream likely hastened its passage in 2015.
41“Il regolamento delle primarie per i parlamentari del PD”, Il Post, 18 December 2012; Valeria Fedeli,
email interview, 14 May 2014.
42Valeria Valente, personal interview, 9 April 2014, Rome, Italy.
43“Il Pd di Renzi, partito trasversale: i dati EMG”, YouTrend.it, 28 May 2014.
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Party Response
Party Quota Quota Law
Competition
Threat from Left
Context
Stop loss to Left, Stop loss to
but potential loss to
Right
Left and Right
=⇒ (Hypothesis 2 )
Portugal
Italy 2015
No threat from Left
Weak party: Weak party:
Ineffective Effective
=⇒ (Hypothesis 1 )
Belgium
Strong party: Strong party:
Effective Effective
Austria
Italy 2005
Figure 2: Party Incentives to Adopt a Quota Law in Five Cases
Figure 2 replicates Figure 1, this time showing where each of the countries analyzed
in this study falls in the table of scenarios and outcomes. The two failed cases of quota
adoption, Austria and Italy 2005, fall in the bottom-left cell, where there is no advantage to
be gained by adopting a quota law over a party quota. The cases of Portugal and Italy 2015
fall in the top-right cell. In both of these cases, the law offered a way to stop electoral losses
from a rising far left party while also equalizing the cost of finding new candidates across the
left and right. Finally, the case of Belgium falls into the middle-right cell, where the law is
the only way to effectively implement a quota in the context of weak parties (decentralized
candidate selection procedures). In this case women in the parties and ideological reasons
provided the original impetus for a quota, and male party leaders pushed the legislation
through in order to force their own parties to comply.
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Conclusion
The rapid growth of gender quota laws is surprising especially because it seems to challenge
the dominant paradigm of rational, self-interested politicians. As one Portuguese politician
put it, “They [men] want to keep control of the power.”44 The four countries treated in
depth in this article give us clues into the dynamics of institutional change. When faced
with increasing competition within or between parties, male party leadership will employ
quotas as a mechanism to consolidate power and increase their electoral competitiveness.
Strategic incentives provide an important missing link in the chain of events leading to the
passage of a national quota law.
These policy changes were not made in a vacuum, and certainly the role of women
within and across parties, transnational information sharing, and ideology were also crucial.
Here I focus on the role of male party elites, and the conditions under which they are
willing to support these reforms. My findings build on previous work in the field of gender
and politics which highlight the role electoral competition, suggesting that a rising far left
party in particular is a powerful incentive for male party leaders. I also provide a second
strategic explanation which has not been tested in the literature until now, that national
party leaders adopt quotas to gain control over local party leaders in decentralized systems.
These conditions could theoretically occur at the same time, leading party leaders to support
quotas for reasons of both intra- and inter-party strategic gain, but my analysis suggests that
either can be sufficient motivation for quota adoption on their own.
The findings are important for two main reasons. First, understanding the strategic
incentives behind male support for quota laws can help quota advocates target their argument
to the specific country-context likely to be relevant. In the case of Austria, for example,
quota supporters would do well to emphasize the growing threat on the left to male party
44Anonymous (PS MP), personal interview, 26 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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leaders. This matters because quotas have been shown to increase women’s descriptive
representation (Jones 1998; McAllister and Studlar 2002; Meier 2004; Jones 2004; Schmidt
and Saunders 2004; Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Davidson-Schmich 2006; Tripp and Kang
2008; Hughes 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Paxton et al. 2010; Hughes 2011), and descriptive
representation is linked to the substantive representation of women’s interests (Carey et al.
1998; Thomas 1994; Swers 2002; Dodson 2006; Hogan 2008; Reingold 1992; Esaiasson and
Heidar 2000; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Celis 2007). Increasing quota adoption thus
has the potential to boost the quality of our democracies.
Second, this research has potential implications beyond gender quota laws. The politics
of quota adoption could help inform and refine our understanding of the broader dynamics
of institutional and policy change. Quotas are “one of the most important political devel-
opments of the modern era” (O’Brien and Rickne 2016, p. 112). Yet the motives behind
this huge change, seen in the light of intra- and inter-party competition, are not so puzzling.
If we consider the strategic incentives of party leaders, the adoption of quotas has much in
common with other forms of seemingly irrational institutional change – such as extending
the suffrage and adopting election primaries. The argument advanced through case studies
here could be tested cross-nationally in future quantitative studies, particularly as we gain
better data on candidate selection methods over time.
The framework of intra- and inter-party competition could also help us understand vari-
ation in other policy reforms that disproportionately benefit women or minorities; for exam-
ple, the extension of work-family policies. Previous work suggests that work-family policies
are deployed for electoral purposes in Europe, focusing mainly on inter-party competition
(electoral defeat driving parties to target women) (Morgan 2013). Considering intra-party
competition as well, such as the degree of factionalism within parties and the strategic mo-
tivations for incorporating women’s demands, could help us make sense of reforms driven by
strong parties (e.g., the case of Sweden under Social Democratic dominance).
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Appendix
This document provides supplementary information for “Why Are Gender Quotas Adopted
by Men? The Role of Inter- and Intra-Party Competition” Specifically, it includes: (A) Case
Study Matching Procedure (B) Interview Methods.
Appendix A: Case Study Matching Procedure
The following section provides further details about the statistical matching procedure used
to select paired cases, including a discussion of similarities and differences between the
matched pair countries and tables showing the data used.
I match on six variables identified as potential determinants of quota adoption: percent-
age of women in parliament, proportional representation, economic development (income
per capita), women’s labor force participation, percentage of parties with voluntary quotas
(weighted by seat share in parliament), and percentage of population Catholic (1980).45
Percentage of women in parliament is included because most countries that pass a quota
law have low levels of women in parliament before the law is passed, as discussed in the
main text. This makes an intervention like a quota likely to be useful, although certainly
many countries with low levels of women’s representation do not go on to pass a quota
(e.g., the United States), and some with high levels of women’s representation do (e.g.,
Spain). Economic development and women’s labor force participation are included due to
their correlation with increases in women’s representation (Matland 1998; McAllister and
Studlar 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Tripp and Kang 2008). According to Inglehart
and Norris (2000), economic development goes hand in hand with the transformation of sex
45Data on percentage of women in parliament, female labor force participation, and proportional repre-
sentation come from the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version; income per capita
comes from the U.N. World Development Indicators (2014); percentage of the population Catholic as of 1980
from (La Porta et al. 1999); and the share of parties with voluntary gender quotas comes from an original
dataset.
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roles and attitudes towards women, female participation in the workforce, and ultimately
the supply and demand of female candidates for political office. Catholicism is also included
because of its potential link to women’s representation. Catholic culture has been linked to
low levels of women’s representation in office, and every country that has passed a quota
law in Europe has a strong tradition of Catholicism (Castles 1994; Esping-Andersen 1990).
Proportional represenation is included because quotas are thought to be more compatible
with PR systems where the party presents a list of candidates than with majority systems
with lower district magnitude (Matland, 2006). Finally, I include voluntary party quotas
because party-level experience with voluntary gender quota provisions might also be linked
to adoption of a quota law. In addition to contagion theory, parties that have already passed
internal quotas have already had the critical debate, making members more likely to be
unified in support for a national law. Parties also gain experience implementing the law and
are able to see that it is effective.
I considered controlling for several other variables correlated with quota adoption. First,
research has highlighted the importance of strong women’s movements advocating for change,
especially women’s sections in the party (Kittilson 2006; Dahlerup 2006). Unfortunately it
is very difficult to measure the presence or strength of women’s movements or party sections
across countries over time. The best data available come from Htun and Weldon (2012), who
compile measures of the strength and autonomy of feminist women’s movements over time
in 70 countries. These data show that there was no change in the strength or autonomy of
women’s movements in Belgium or Portugal before a quota law was passed. In other words,
a trend towards strong, autonomous women’s movements is not present before quota laws
were passed in these cases. My interview data further confirmed that women’s movements
were not crucial players in these cases.
Second, scholars also point to international information sharing as a key factor in quota
adoption (Krook 2006, 2008) – and in my cases, particularly at the European level. Two
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of the international influences most frequently cited in my interviews were the European
Commission and Council of Europe.46 Because all advanced democracies are likely to be
similarly influenced by these bodies, I do not include this as a matching variable. I return
to the question of international influence and women’s sections in parties in the subsequent
section on balance on other potential confounders.
The matching procedure is carried out using the MatchIt package version 2.4-20 in R
version 2.14.0. I conduct separate matching procedures for Belgium and Portugal, subsetting
the data to countries with elections in the years including and immediately preceding the
year in which a quota law was adopted for each case (1994 in Belgium and 2006 in Portugal).
I include only one election-year per country.
I drop other ‘quota countries’ before matching. I use nearest neighbor, Mahalanobis
matching. Nearest neighbor matching selects the single best control match for each ‘treated’
unit (i.e., Belgium and Portugal). Matching is done using a distance measure, and here the
Mahalanobis option is used because it allows for continuous covariates (Ho et al. 2011). The
match is selected based on Mahalanobis distance, a generalization of Euclidean distance that
accounts for correlations between variables (Rubin 1973). Tables A1 and A2 at the end of
this section present data used in the matching procedures. Matched pairs are in bold.
The matching procedure successfully identifies matches for both Belgium and Portugal.
Belgium is matched to Austria, and Portugal is matched to Italy. Taking Belgium and
Austria first, both are considered social democratic welfare states, and as Table A1 shows
they had very similar levels of economic development and female labor force participation
in this time period. Before the Belgian quota law both had relatively few women in office
– although Belgium especially so (9%, compared to Austria’s 22%). The electoral systems
in the two countries are similar, both having closed list PR systems with medium-sized
districts (about 14 - 20 legislators elected per district on average) in the early 1990s.47
46Other international influences were global, e.g. CEDAW, Socialist Women International.
47After 1995 Belgium adopted several changes to increase the importance of preference votes, so it is now
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Both countries have a strong history of Catholicism, with 89% and 90% of the population
identifying as Catholic in 1980 in Austria and Belgium respectively. Both also had political
parties with voluntary quota laws, including the socialist SPO¨ in Austria and the Flemish
Christan Democrats and Social Democrats in Belgium. Finally, I note that Austria is one of
the only advanced democracies where a quota law was proposed by the national parliament
following the 1994 elections but failed to pass (in 1999) (Ko¨pl, 2005). This suggests that it
is a particularly good counterfactual for the case of Belgium.
Portugal and Italy are Southern European countries with similarly low levels of women
in office before the Portuguese quota law was adopted (21% and 10% respectively). The
electoral systems at the time were similar, with both having closed list PR systems and
multi-member districts. Catholicism is also very strong in both countries. The main left-
wing parties in both countries had a voluntary party quota at the time (the DS in Italy and
the PS in Portugal). The match is less close on the economy and women’s employment. Italy
is a higher income country, but in Portugal a greater percentage of women are active in the
labor market. However, since both of these factors are hypothesized to lead to greater levels
of women’s representation and higher social spending, the bias from the mismatch ought
to even out. I also note that the two countries’ economies are often compared due to high
national budget deficits relative to GDP, and high, or rising, government debt levels (as in
the derogatory ‘PIGS’ acronym). Finally, I have extra confidence in this match because –
as in the case of Austria – a quota law was proposed in Italy around the same time as in
Portugal.
Balance on other potential confounders
Turning to the other variables that have been cited as causes of quota adoption in the
literature, we can see that both matches are European countries, and thus would have been
subject to similar influence by the Council of Europe, European Commission, and other
considered an open list system.
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European-level and global organizations. Both Austria and Italy also have some political
parties with established women’s sections, like their counterparts in Belgium and Portugal.
In Austria both the Social Democratic party and the Austrian People’s Party have had
a women’s section since 1945.48 In Italy the Democratic Party of the Left established a
women’s section in the party in 1991 (Guadagnini 2005).
Table A1: Data for Matching: Belgium
Country Election % Women GNI PR Female labor % Catholic Party quotas
year in parliament per capita force participation (1980) (%)
Belgium 1991 9.4 28,513 1 41.81 90 35
Australia 1993 8.8 24,411 1 41.74 29.6 0
Austria 1994 21.9 29,186 1 42.81 88.8 43
Canada 1993 18 25,412 0 44.74 46.6 63
Denmark 1994 33.5 38,630 1 45.66 0.6 35
Finland 1991 39 25,295 1 47.18 0.1 0
Germany 1994 21.9 29,396 1 NA 35 45
Great Britain 1992 9.2 25,533 0 43.77 13.1 0
Greece 1993 6 15,632 1 37.25 0.4 57
Iceland 1991 23.8 38.706 1 45.77 0.7 38
Ireland 1992 12 20.952 1 NA 95.3 0
Japan 1993 2.67 32,574 1 40.53 0.6 0
Luxembourg 1994 20 51,662 1 36.14 93 0
Netherlands 1994 31.3 31,122 1 41.32 42.6 28
New Zealand 1993 21.2 19.172 1 43.53 18.7 0
Norway 1993 39.4 47,290 1 45.42 0.3 76
Sweden 1991 33.5 29,576 1 47.98 1.4 5
Switzerland 1991 17.5 48,306 1 41.73 52.8 21
United States 1992 11 32,791 0 44.83 30 0
48http://frauen.spoe.at/ueber-uns;
http://www.frauenoffensive.at/service/geschichte-der-oesterreichischen-frauenbewegung.html; and see Kopl
2005.
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Table A2: Data for Matching: Portugal
Country Election % Women GNI PR Female labor % Catholic Party quotas
year in parliament per capita force participation (1980) (%)
Portugal 2005 21.3 17,994 1 46.75 94.1 52
Australia 2004 24.7 32,379 1 44.65 29.6 40
Canada 2004 21.1 33,704 0 46.61 46.6 50
Denmark 2005 36.9 48,209 1 47.33 0.6 0
Finland 2003 37.5 34,774 1 48.17 0.1 0
Germany 2005 31.8 33,922 1 45.18 35 81
Great Britain 2005 19.7 39,130 0 45.97 13.1 0
Greece 2004 13 21,094 1 40.66 0.4 39
Ireland 2002 13.25 37,004 1 41.65 95.3 0
Italy 2001 9.8 30,204 1 38.74 83.2 26
Japan 2005 9 36,615 1 41.35 0.6 0
Luxembourg 2004 23.3 68,354 1 41.96 93 75
Netherlands 2003 36.7 38,146 1 44.17 42.6 33
New Zealand 2005 32.3 25,711 1 46.42 18.7 0
Norway 2001 35.8 61,673 1 46.6 0.3 59
Sweden 2002 45 37,583 1 47.96 1.4 54
Switzerland 2003 25 53,493 1 44.65 52.8 26
United States 2004 14.9 43,615 0 46.18 30 0
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Appendix B: Interview Methods
The following section details interview methodology, including constructing a sampling
frame, interview format and response rate, recording, and compensation strategies for un-
certainty.
In composing the sample frame, I sought a diversity of interview subjects – men and
women, politicians, bureaucrats, and activists – who were participants and observers of the
process to adopt a quota law. Most importantly, I looked for subjects who could offer the best
evidence about quota adoption – including past and present party leaders, cabinet members,
politicians and activists. I used parliamentary proceedings and newspaper coverage of quota
debates, as well as secondary literature, to determine key actors. I also gave interviewees the
opportunity to recommend other potential interview subjects. Many times these subjects
were already in the sample frame, but some new interviews also resulted from these referrals.
All in-person interviews were recorded, with the approval of the interviewee (one interview
was not recorded due to technical problems). Audio was transcribed immediately following
the interview, along with any other relevant notes or observations. Audio and transcripts of
all interviews are available on request (one interviewee requested anonymity, so this recording
is not available).
The majority of interviews were semi-structured, with the exception of structured email
interviews when in-person interviews were not possible. The core questions were: 1) Why
did your political party support / not support national quota legislation? 2) Why did (other
party/ies) support / not support the quota law? 3) Why do you think the quota law passed
(did not pass) at X time? In order to facilitate rapport, questions were often rephrased
for individual respondents given their own documented views or actions related to the quota
debate. At the end of interviews, respondents were also given an opportunity to add anything
they thought relevant to the discussion.
56
Most of the interviews were conducted in English. While Austria and Belgium are both
countries characterized by very high English proficiency, I expected more variation in the
cases of Italy and Portugal. Initial emails were sent in both English and native language
in these cases (I am proficient in Italian, and used a translator in the case of Portugal). In
Portugal, all respondents save for one responded in English, and all interviews were conducted
in English. I was unable to conduct one interview with a member of the communist party
in Portugal because of translator unavailability. In Italy, contacts responded in both Italian
and English, and interviews also took place in both languages (often both in the course of
the same interview). In this way, interviewees were able to express themselves comfortably
in whichever language they preferred. Because interviews were recorded, I could go back,
re-listen, and translate into English different portions of the interview as needed.
Table B1 below reports all interviews sought, obtained, and declined. Interviewees are
divided into categories based on country, and then their occupation and party affiliation,
with the main groupings being left-wing politicians, right-wing politicians, and women’s
movement activists, since these are the actors central to accounts of quota adoption.
Overall the response rate was just under 50% (61/124). Notably, I was unable to obtain
any interviews with members of right-wing parties in Italy. I was also unable to obtain
any interviews with men in Italy. Response rates for individual countries are: Austria
66% (12/18), Belgium 58% (23/40), Italy 33% (10/30), Portugal 44% (16/36). The gender
breakdown of interviews overall is 20% men, 80% women. One important reason that women
are overrepresented is that they were key actors in debates about quota law adoption, and so
they are similarly overrepresented in the sample frame. However, it is also the case that in
some instances male potential interviewees were less responsive than women (Italy, and to a
lesser extent Austria). The gender breakdown for individual countries is as follows: Austria
92% female (1 man, 11 women), Belgium 78% female (5 men, 18 women), Italy 100% female
(10 women), Portugal 63% female (6 men, 10 women).
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Absent interviews with right-wing politicians in Italy, and with male party elites in Italy
and Austria, I supplement interview data with parliamentary debates and newspaper cov-
erage about quota law adoption. While certainty about individual perspectives cannot be
complete, these original sources do provide important missing information, often with ver-
batim accounts. Pairing interview data with primary source material thus raises confidence
that findings are unbiased.
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Table B1: Interview Methods Table
Interviewee Status Source Format Length Documentation
Austria
Category 1: Left-wing parties
Andrea Brunner, SPO¨ women’s section Conducted
in person
04/22/14
Sample frame
and referred by
Gisela Wurm
Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Irmtraut Karlsson, SPO¨ politician Conducted
in person
05/12/14
Sample frame
and referred by
Andrea Brun-
ner
Semi-
structured
60 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Gisela Wurm, SPO¨ politician Conducted
via email
04/27/14
Sample frame Structured NA Email tran-
script available
Ines Stilling, Ministry bureaucrat Conducted
in person
04/22/14
Referred by Ju-
lia Valsky
Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Julia Valsky, spokesperson for SPO¨ Minister Conducted
in person
05/05/14
Substitute in
sample frame
Semi-
structured
35 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
SPO¨ Minister’s aide Conducted
in person
04/18/14
Substitute in
sample frame
Semi-
structured
70 min Confidentiality
requested
Berivan Aslan, The Greens politician Conducted
via email
04/01/14
Sample frame Structured NA Email tran-
script available
Ulrike Lunacek, The Greens politician Conducted
via email
04/25/14
Sample frame Structured NA Email tran-
script available
Judith Schwentner, The Greens politician Conducted
in person
05/06/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
45 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
SPO¨ Minister Refused
04/17/14
Sample frame
SPO¨ politician 1 Refused
04/01/14
Sample frame
SPO¨ politician 2 Accepted
04/29/14,
then no
response
Sample frame
Category 2: Right-wing parties
Claudia Durchschlag, O¨VP politician Conducted
in person
05/05/14
Sample frame
and referred by
O¨VP politician
Semi-
structured
40 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Martina Schenk, Team Stronach politician Conducted
in person
05/07/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
O¨VP politician Refused
03/31/14
Sample frame
FPO¨ politician 1 Accepted
05/01/14,
then no
response
Referred by
Andrea Brun-
ner
FPO¨ politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Category 3: Women’s movements
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Brigitte Hornyik, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
05/08/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
45 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Belgium
Category 1: Left-wing parties
Anne-Marie Lizin, PS politician Conducted
in person
09/09/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
55 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Yvan Mayeur, PS politician Conducted
in person
10/17/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
30 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Louis Tobback, SP.A politician Conducted
in person
09/20/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
70 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Renaat Landyut, SP.A politician Conducted
in person
09/23/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
25 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Vera Claes, SP.A women’s section Conducted
in person
10/10/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
60 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Emily Hoyos, ECOLO party leader Conducted
in person
09/13/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
35 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
ECOLO politician No re-
sponse
Groen! party leader No re-
sponse
PS Minister Refused
09/19/13
Sample frame
PS politician 1 Refused
09/04/13
Sample frame
PS politician 2 Accepted
09/27/13,
then no
response
Sample frame
SP.A politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
SP.A politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Category 2: Christian Democrats
Sabine de Bethune, CDV politician Conducted
in person
09/05/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
80 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Els Van Hoofe, CDV women’s section Conducted
in person
10/16/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
75 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Tinneke Huyghe, CDV politician Conducted
in person
10/16/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
75 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Niki Dheedene, cdH Minister’s aide Conducted
in person
10/08/13
Referred by
cdH Minister 1
Semi-
structured
60 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
cdH party leader No re-
sponse
Sample frame
cdH Minister 1 Refused
08/29/13
Sample frame
cdH Minister 2 Refused
10/03/13
Sample frame
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CDV politician 1 Accepted
09/19/13,
then un-
available
Sample frame
CDV politician 2 Accepted
09/05/13,
then un-
available
Sample frame
Category 3: Right-wing parties
Gerolf Annemans, VB party leader Conducted
in person
09/10/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
55 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Gwendolyn Rutten, Open VLD party leader Conducted
in person
10/02/13
Sample frame
and referred
by Open VLD
politician
Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Joachim Pohlmann, N-VA party official Conducted
in person
09/10/13
Referred by
N-VA party
leader
Semi-
structured
30 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Viviane Teitelbaum, MR politician Conducted
in person
10/23/13
Referred by
Anne-Marie
Lizin and MR
politician 1
Semi-
structured
30 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
MR politician 1 Refused
10/18/13
Sample frame
MR politician 2 Accepted
09/16/13,
then no
response
Sample frame
Open VLD politician 1 Refused
08/27/13
Sample frame
Open VLD politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
VB politician No re-
sponse
Sample frame
N-VA party leader Refused
08/30/13
Sample frame
N-VA politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
N-VA politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
FDF politician No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Category 4: Women’s movements
Eveline Cortier, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
10/03/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Kitty Roggeman, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
10/03/13
Referred by
Eveline Cortier
Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Hedwige Peemans-Poullet, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
10/04/13
Referred by Pe-
tra Meier and
Karen Celis
Semi-
structured
70 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Women’s movement activist 1
Women’s movement activist 2
Italy
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Category 1: Left-wing parties
Elsa Fornero, PD Minister Conducted
in person
03/27/14,
w/ Skype
follow-up
Sample frame Semi-
structured
80 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Cecilia Guerra, PD politician Conducted
in person
04/09/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
60 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Rosa Calipari, PD politician Conducted
via email
05/19/14
Referred by Si-
mona Lanzoni
Structured NA Email tran-
script available
Valeria Fedeli, PD politician Conducted
via email
05/14/14
Referred by
Ludovica
Tranquilli Leali
Structured NA Email tran-
script available
Valeria Valente, PD politician Conducted
in person
04/09/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Elettra Deiana, PRC, then SEL politician Conducted
in person
04/11/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
120
min
Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
DS politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PD politician 1 Accepted
03/27/14,
then un-
avaiable
PD politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PD politician 3 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PD politician 4 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
and referred by
Elsa Fornero
PD politician 5 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PD politician 6 No re-
sponse
Referred by Si-
mona Lanzoni
sample frame
PRC politician Accepted
02/25/14,
then un-
available
Sample frame
Category 2: Right-wing parties
FI politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
FI politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
FI politician 3 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
FI politician 4 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
FI politician 5 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Pdl politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Pdl politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Pdl politician 3 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
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LN politician No re-
sponse
Sample frame
UdC politician Accepted
03/27/14,
then un-
available
Category 3: Other parties
C5S politician No re-
sponse
Sample frame
SEL politician No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Category 4: Women’s movements
Ludovica Tranquilli Leali, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
03/25/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
80 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Simona Lanzoni, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
03/21/14
Sample frame Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Titti Carano, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
03/21/14
Sample frame
and referred by
Ludovica Tran-
quilli Leali
Semi-
structured
75 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Vittoria Tola, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
03/15/14
Referred by Si-
mona Lanzoni
Semi-
structured
90 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Portugal
Category 1: Left-wing parties
Maria de Belem, PS party leader Conducted
in person
11/07/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
40 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Ana Gomes, PS politician Conducted
in person
12/06/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
35 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Augusto Santos Silva, PS Minister Conducted
in person
11/12/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
50 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Elza Pais, PS politician Conducted
in person
11/26/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
40 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Caterina Marcelino, PS politician Conducted
in person
11/26/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
40 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Sonia Fertuzinhos, PS politician Conducted
in person
11/22/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
60 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Vitalino Canas, PS politician Conducted
via email
10/16/13
Sample frame Structured NA Email tran-
script available
Luis Fazenda, BE politician Conducted
in person
11/05/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
40 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
BE politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
BE politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
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BE politician 3 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PS politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PS politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PS politician 3 Refused
10/128/13
Sample frame
PS politician 4 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PS politician 5 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PS politician 6 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PCP politician 1 Refused
10/16/13
Sample frame
PCP politician 2 Accepted
10/28/13,
then un-
available
Sample frame
and referred by
PCP politician
1
Category 2: Right-wing parties
Helder Amaral, CDS politician Conducted
in person
11/06/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
40 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Joa˜o Almeida, CDS politician Conducted
in person
11/20/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
35 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Teresa Caeiro, CDS politician Conducted
in person
11/05/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
60 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Jose´ Mendes Bota, PSD politician Conducted
in person
11/07/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
45 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Paula Cardoso, PSD politician Conducted
in person
12/05/13
Substitute
from sample
frame
Semi-
structured
35 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Monica Ferro, PSD politician Conducted
in person
12/05/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
35 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Teresa Morais, PSD Minister Conducted
in person
12/02/13
Substitute
from sample
frame
Semi-
structured
45 min Notes written
w/in 1 hr avail-
able
CDS politician 1 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PSD politician 1 Refused
10/10/13
Sample frame
PSD politician 2 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PSD politician 3 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
PSD politician 4 No re-
sponse
Sample frame
Category 3: Women’s movements
Ana Coucello, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
12/03/13
Referred by
Alexandra
Silva (EWL)
Semi-
structured
145
min
Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Maria Jose Magalhaes, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
11/08/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
60 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
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Fatima Duarte, women’s policy agency bureaucrat Conducted
via email
12/09/13
Sample frame Structured NA Email tran-
script available
Nora Kiss, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
10/30/13
Sample frame Semi-
structured
40 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
Regina Tavares da Silva, women’s movement activist Conducted
in person
11/13/13
Referred by
Alexandra
Silva (EWL)
Semi-
structured
45 min Audio record-
ing and tran-
script available
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